the private sector is facilitated by six staff members of the LWIB, who continually call on businesses to inquire about the type of skills businesses require. They also conduct focus groups and pursue other means to obtain and follow current local conditions.
Conclusion
The joint study examined cases in which LWIBs have worked within the flexibility and decentralization of the U.S. workforce system to foster collaboration among local organizations. It observed that there was no one right way to form effective partnerships. Rather, the flexibility of the workforce system allowed LWIBs to bring key stakeholders and organizations together in ways that worked best for job seekers and employers, which can enhance job creation. The study also underscored the benefit of working closely with businesses to understand their needs for qualified workers and to design training curricula that address those needs. Furthermore, WIA's culture of evidencebased policy making and performance outcome monitoring established by WIA workforce programs sets an example for other organizations within the local area to follow.
Note
The assistance of Jonathan Barr and Francesca Froy of the OECD/LEED and Robert Straits of the Upjohn Institute in preparing the full U.S. report is greatly appreciated.
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